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Büchner and Real Presence: a Reading of the Kunstgespräch in Lenz 
John Walker 
Abstract. The passage known as the Kunstgespräch in Lenz is one of the best known in Büchner’s 
work, and often read as both an anticipatory statement of the particular character of nineteenth-
century German realism and one of the most remarkably “modern” of early nineteenth-century 
German narrative texts. In this chapter I pursue two theses about this famous passage and its sequel. 
First, that it exemplifies George Steiner’s thesis in his book Real Presences that literature can be a 
manifestation of God’s real presence in language and, second that it also manifests, when read in the 
context of Büchner’s Novelle as a whole, what Steiner calls ‘the break of the covenant between word 
and world’ which he sees as characteristic of European modernism that began around 1870, about 
thirty-five years after Büchner’s text was written. This divine covenant establishes the connection 
between Logos and word - what Steiner calls ‘the saying of Being’ - and can therefore be read in a 
theological context for which the idea of art as a mode of incarnation is meaningful. However, it also 
insistently reminds us of the difference between the theological and aesthetic modes of truth and 
should warn us against their critical identification. In particular, several moments in this text strongly 
suggest that we should not read Lenz through the prism of the German idealist aesthetics of Hegel and 
Schelling, especially their implicit claim that all art is concerned with beauty as the appearance of 
spiritual truth in sensuous form and can therefore be approached via a critical vocabulary more 
appropriate to the visual and plastic arts than to realist narrative. This last point is especially relevant 
because the reception of visual art and its dramatic effect on the protagonist are central themes in 
Lenz.  
 
The passage known as the Kunstgespräch is the conversation in Pastor Oberlin’s presbytery 
at Waldersbach between Büchner’s character Lenz and the visitor Kaufmann about the 
representation of reality in art.
1
 It is immediately preceded by a description of the church 
service at which Lenz has been invited to preach, bringing him both a brief emotional release 
from his mental distress and a moment of lucidity which foreshadows the intellectual 
exchange that takes place in the Kunstgespräch itself (MA, p. 142). The church service is a 
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key moment in the text because it both represents and expresses a meaningful connection to 
the suffering of others which is otherwise lacking in Lenz’s experience:  
 Ein süßes Gefühl menschlichen Wohls beschlich ihn…sie litten alle mit ihm, und es war 
ihm ein Trost, wenn er über einige müdgeweinte Augen Schlaf, und gequälten Herzen Ruhe 
bringen, wenn er über dieses von materiellen Bedürfnissen gequälte Sein, diese dumpfe 
Leiden gen Himmel leiten konnte.
2
.  
The key word here is litten. Suffering here is the touchstone of reality in Lenz’s experience: 
the only thing which makes his experience both significant and real. Both the theological and 
the existential meaning of this idea are manifest in the hymn which the congregation sings 
together with Lenz:  
             Laß in mir die heil’gen Schmerzen, 
   Tiefe Bronnen ganz aufbrechen;  
   Leiden sei all’ mein Gewinst, 
   Leiden sei mein Gottesdienst
3
 
 
The presence of the word Leiden in a pietist hymn by Christian Friedrich Richter (1676-1711) 
clearly suggests that human suffering is linked to the sufferings of Christ, and that the 
experience of that connection can be a source of redemption. Lenz is said both to be 
connected to the sufferings of the people when he preaches - ‘sie litten alle mit ihm’ - and yet 
after hearing the words of the hymn to be more than ever conscious of his own alienation: ‘Er 
ging auf sein einsames Zimmer…er war allein, allein…er fühlte tiefen unnennbaren Schmerz 
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davon…er konnte kein Ende finden der Wollust; endlich dämmerte es in ihm, er empfand ein 
leises tiefes Mitleid mit sich selbst.’4  
His experience is both of pain beyond articulation (‘er fühlte tiefen unnennbaren Schmerz 
davon’) and yet also one of blissful reconciliation to himself (‘er konnte kein Ende finden der 
Wollust… er empfand ein leises tiefes Mitleid mit sich selbst’). To be alone in this sense is to 
suffer but not to be alienated, because Lenz is enabled precisely by the acceptance of his 
suffering to connect himself to the common suffering of humankind. The point is that 
suffering, although negative in itself, can confer ontological and therefore theological 
meaning through the connection it makes possible with others and with God.  
This perception is the precondition for Lenz’s participation in the Kunstgespräch. His sense 
of the value and significance of reality is now articulated in aesthetic terms, but crucially it is 
also expressed in terms of the primacy of ontology over aesthetic judgement:  
Die Dichter, von denen man sage, sie geben die Wirklichkeit, hätten auch keine 
Ahnung davon, doch seien sie immer noch erträglicher, als die, welche die 
Wirklichkeit verklären wollten…Ich verlange in allem Leben, Möglichkeit des 
Daseins, und dann ist’s gut; wir haben dann nicht zu fragen, ob es schön, ob es 
häßlich ist, das Gefühl, daß Was geschaffen sei, Leben habe, stehe über diesen 
Beiden, und sei das einzige Kriterium in Kunstsachen.
5
  
For Lenz, this position represents a radical rejection of aesthetic idealism (‘Dieser Idealismus 
ist die schändlichste Verachtung der menschlichen Natur’, ‘This idealism is the most 
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disgraceful mockery of human nature’ (MA, p. 144, TMW, p. 91). However, it is underwritten 
by what seems like an unequivocal affirmation of God’s real presence as the precondition for 
realism in art: ‘Er sagte: Der liebe Gott hat die Welt wohl gemacht sie wie sein soll, und wir 
können wohl nicht was Besseres klecksen, unser einziges Bestreben soll sein, ihm ein wenig 
nachzuschaffen.’6  
This statement by Büchner’s character Lenz appears directly to echo George Steiner’s 
formulation of the inescapable connection between Logos and word, and the idea of art as the 
‘saying of Being’ which follows from it.7. But of course Lenz’s affirmation is one utterance 
by a fictional character at a particular point in a fictional text. That Büchner’s character says 
this cannot therefore bear out the contention that Büchner’s text as a whole exemplifies 
Steiner’s view of literature as a vehicle of real presence. Indeed, the abstract formulation of 
such a position by a character within a literary text might seem to contradict Steiner’s thesis 
that literary representation itself can be understood in terms of an aesthetic of incarnation. 
How then can we read Büchner’s text today in the light of the question which Steiner poses?  
 
First, we have to read the Kunstgespräch as an episode in the context of Büchner’s narration 
as a whole. It is clear that the words on suffering he hears in the singing of the pietist hymn - 
whether or not he actually sings them – lead him to experience a kind of actively 
apprehended passivity (the biblical word ‘passion’ is strikingly apt) in which the Gospel 
narrative of the sufferings of Christ is incorporated into, and so becomes the expression of, 
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his own being: ‘Das Drängen in ihm, die Musik, der Schmerz, erschütterte ihn. Das All war 
für ihn in Wunden ... .’8. 
What matters to him is the oneness of spiritual truth with its mode of expression. Lenz is 
what Steiner calls, on the analogy of dramatic or musical performance, ‘an executant, one 
who acts out the material before him so as to give it intelligible life’ (RP, p. 7). This is 
reflected in the content of the conversation which follows. What Büchner’s character Lenz, 
like George Steiner, rejects, is secondary commentary in excess of his primary experience of 
art. What he seeks is the direct embodiment of immediate experience in the medium of art, 
not a reflective experience in excess of that medium: ‘Der Dichter und Bildende ist mir der 
Liebste, der mir die Natur am Wirklichsten gibt, so daß ich über sein Gebild fühle, Alles 
Übrige stört mich.’9  
It is crucial that Lenz’s remark is prompted by his response to painting, here the still life and 
domestic interiors of the Dutch masters, and especially the two paintings of Christ greeting 
the disciples on the road to Emmaus and of a village woman, unable to go to church, 
worshipping at home whilst the church is visible in the distance.
10
 Lenz is said to have 
forgotten himself (‘Er hatte sich ganz vergessen’ (MA, p. 146, cf. TMW, p. 92)) in the course 
of the conversation, because that is the effect which the paintings have had on him. An 
emphasis on painting and the plastic arts as the silent and sensuous embodiment of spiritual 
truth is central to the aesthetic of German idealism, which has remarkably little (especially 
little positive) to say about realist narration. For Hegel and Schelling especially, art is the 
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vehicle of an ideal truth which can also, in another but closely related way, be articulated in 
theological terms.
11
 In this paradigm, realist narrative can coherently be described as an 
inferior form, because the immediate embodiment of meaning in form - and therefore in the 
aesthetic experience of the reader - can occur only intermittently in a realist narrative. 
Narrative realism (as Hegel famously argued in his Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der 
Ästhetik) is less concerned with the embodiment of truth in experience than with that self-
conscious reflection about experience which, Hegel argues, is characteristic of the modern 
post-romantic world.
12
 There is however a crucial ambivalence in Hegel’s account of 
‘realism’ in both literature and art. Hegel’s account of narrative realism is brief and 
peripheral in relation to his philosophical aesthetics, which defines aesthetic truth as 
immediate presence in a sensuous medium, not as representation or interpretation through the 
written word.
13
 However, whilst rejecting as unworthy of serious literary treatment the 
objects presented to narrative realism by the modern world, he also comments approvingly on 
the breadth of subject matter which modern ‘realism’, especially in the paintings of the Dutch 
masters that Büchner’s character Lenz also admires, can encompass.14 Hegel’s rejection of 
narrative realism as a mode of representation reflects his rejection of the alienated 
subjectivity – the divorce between the inner life and outward social experience – that he 
regards as characteristic of modern culture. His dismissal of the modern novel is really a 
denial that the characteristic form of the novel in the German-speaking world – the romantic 
Bildungsroman – can be an adequate representation of modernity.15 Hegel’s apparently 
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negative judgement of narrative realism reflects his judgement that the romantic form of art, 
and the cultural world which it once expressed, has come to an end.  The kind of ‘realism’ 
which might represent the new - that is to say, the ‘modern’ – world is less rejected than 
simply absent from Hegel’s philosophical aesthetics.        
Büchner’s text as a whole, unlike German idealist aesthetics, does not suggest the superiority 
of the visual arts over narrative realism. I want to suggest that it is precisely Büchner’s 
narrative rendering of the difference between aesthetic and theological truth which enables us 
to read his text, taken as a whole but focusing specifically on the Kunstgespräch, as a mode 
of what Steiner calls real presence.  
What happens after the Kunstgespräch is as important as what comes before. The remainder 
of Büchner’s narrative provides no further instance of the mental lucidity which Lenz briefly 
enjoys during the Kunstgespräch, or of the real experience of spiritual wholeness occasioned 
by his hearing of the words of the hymn sung at Waldersbach. Rather, it chronicles the 
descent of his personality into a condition of irrevocable mental alienation. After the 
Kunstgespräch Lenz reverts to a state in which his condition is not one of mitleiden or Mitleid 
(compassion) at all. He suffers neither at one with himself nor together with others, but as a 
result of his alienation from both. His isolation now betokens not the difference or the 
intensity of his ability to feel, but his incapacity to do so: ‘Je leerer, je kälter, je sterbender er 
sich innerlich fühlte, desto mehr drängte es in ihm, eine Glut in sich zu wecken, es kamen 
ihm Erinnerungen an die Zeiten, wo Alles in ihm sich drängte, wo er unter all’ seinen 
Empfindungen keuchte; und jetzt so tot’.16  
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This is the context of the most important event in the subsequent narrative: Lenz’s failed 
attempt to resuscitate a child who has died in the neighbourhood of Fouday, in which he 
invokes the words of Christ in the Gospel: ‘Arise and walk’, ‘Steh auf und wandle!’ (TMW, 
p. 96 MA, p. 151). After this episode the Christian symbolism and vocabulary which briefly –  
immediately before the Kunstgespräch – had become a vehicle of creative self-awareness for 
Lenz, now becomes the opposite: the language and the symbol of his mental disease: ‘Es war 
ihm, als könne er eine ungeheure Faust hinauf in den Himmel ballen und Gott herbei reißen 
und zwischen seinen Wolken schleifen; als könnte er die Welt mit den Zähnen zermalmen 
und sie dem Schöpfer in’s Gesicht speien; er schwur, er lästerte.’17 
In his words to Oberlin after this experience Lenz evokes that ‘Langeweile’, 'boredom' which 
Schopenhauer will later diagnose as a total dissociation of consciousness from creative 
action.
18
 However, unlike in Schopenhauer’s philosophy,19 there is no suggestion at all that 
this condition can be mitigated by art, and specifically none that art might be able to absorb 
the alienated consciousness into an aesthetic object and so enable it to feel creative empathy: 
that self-forgetfulness which Lenz was once able to feel before the paintings of the Dutch 
masters. For Lenz now, ‘Langeweile’ makes empathy and therefore its aesthetic expression 
redundant: ‘Ja Herr Pfarrer, sehen Sie, die Langeweile! Die Langeweile! o! so langweilig,  
ich weiß gar nicht mehr, was ich sagen soll, ich habe schon alle Figuren an die Wand 
gezeichnet.’20  
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However, it is precisely at this point that Lenz becomes an artist himself. Immediately after 
this passage comes the second occasion on which the words of a hymn-like text occur in the 
Novella, and they form a counterpoint to those which Lenz hears sung in church just before 
the Kunstgespräch. But the later words are not part of any existing hymn or poem at all; they 
are composed by Lenz himself: 
  
 O Gott in Deines Lichtes Welle,  
 In Deines glühenden Mittags Helle 
 Sind meine Augen wund gemacht  
   Wird es denn niemals wieder Nacht?
21
  
 
These words too refer to suffering and to God, but they evoke less the meaning of suffering 
 than a desperate plea for its extinction through the annihilation of consciousness itself.
22 
Lenz tells Oberlin, as he tells the reader, that his suffering is now “unreal” and therefore 
irredeemable for him because it can never be represented to or by the sufferer and so become 
real (‘ich habe schon alle Figuren an die Wand gezeichnet’, ‘I've already drawn all sorts of 
figures on the wall’). Yet Büchner’s text, through his character’s portrayal, makes it real for 
us. As Hermann Pongs showed,
23
 a similar “rewriting” of the same pietist hymn occurs in 
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Büchner’s Woyzeck, where it is attributed to the character Woyzeck before he sets out to 
murder Marie:  
Leiden sei all mein Gewinst, 
Leiden sei mein Gottesdienst, 
Herr wie dein Leib war rot und wund,  
So lass mein Herz sein aller Stund.
24
  
 
However, unlike the second couplet in Woyzeck, in which Büchner’s character symbolically 
prefigures his own death in the language and imagery of the crucifixion narrative, the second 
hymn-like passage composed by Lenz deliberately negates the words of the hymn which first 
appear before the Kunstgespräch. Yet Büchner’s character Lenz is indeed an exponent and 
interpreter of the original text. Lenz ‘interprets’ the original in the sense which George 
Steiner gives to the idea of hermeneutics ‘as defining the enactment of answerable 
understanding, of active apprehension’ (RP, p. 7). The achievement of Büchner’s original 
composition, expressed in the words of his fictional character, is to articulate the experience 
of a particular human self as part of a received narrative of incarnation.  
What, then, of real presence in Büchner’s Lenz? Büchner’s text does indeed bear out Steiner’s 
thesis, but in a sense very different from the identification of the theological and aesthetic 
modes of truth which German Idealist aesthetics proposes, and which Büchner’s character 
Lenz briefly experiences in his response to the paintings of the Dutch masters and the peasant 
scenes of the Vosges. This is the position to which Lenz appears briefly to assent in his 
statement that the task of art is to imitate the perfection of Divine Creation. Büchner’s realism 
allows his character to say this (‘Der liebe Gott hat die Welt wohl gemacht wie sie seyn 
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soll…’, 'The Good Lord has certainly made the world as it should be...') at a particular point 
in his text. But his text as a whole shows this notional belief to be utterly at odds with what is 
most real in his character’s actual experience: the reality of human suffering. That reality can 
be neither mitigated nor overcome, although it can perhaps fleetingly be transcended, by the 
experience of art. The achievement of Büchner’s realism is to show us this. In the sequel to 
the Kunstgespräch what Steiner calls ‘the covenant between word and world’ (RP, p. 93) 
breaks down completely. With the exception of his composing verses which echo the 
Waldersbach hymn but radically change its import, Lenz descends into an almost catatonic 
state. His utterances after the second hymn-like sequence reveal only his mental alienation, 
and are marked by that obsessive repeating of particular words and phrases which 
characterises schizophrenic illness: 'Im Gespräch stockte er oft, eine unbeschreibliche Angst 
befiel ihn, er hatte das Ende seines Satzes verloren; dann meinte er, er müsse das zuletzt 
gesprochene Wort behalten und immer sprechen, nur mit großer Anstrengung unterdrückte er 
diese Gelüste.'
25
  
In Büchner’s Lenz the ‘break in the covenant between word and world’ goes deeper than this 
crisis of verbal representation. The real theme of Büchner’s Lenz is not the representation of 
experience in words. The ideal of Büchner’s character Lenz is a form of art which enables its 
recipients to forget themselves because their consciousness is entirely absorbed in the work 
of art itself. It is precisely for this reason that the Kunstgespräch is chiefly about the visual 
and plastic arts which are concerned less with representation than with embodiment. 
However, Büchner’s narrative realism is also centrally concerned with the distance between 
this kind of aesthetic embodiment, so central to German idealist aesthetics, and the alienated 
self-consciousness which desperately plagues its protagonist.  It is precisely this distance – 
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the difference between aesthetic embodiment and that incarnation which is the real presence 
of truth in experience - which is represented in Büchner’s text. That distance can never be 
bridged. However, it can be made articulate and so the object of his readers’ empathy by the 
intrinsically representational and verbal art of realist narrative. The real theme of Büchner’s 
Lenz is not the crisis of representation – the break in the covenant between word and world – 
but a crisis in lived experience which is defined but never attenuated by the idea of 
incarnation: a break in the covenant between words and the Word. That crisis, Büchner’s text 
shows us, can never be reversed or overcome by any aesthetic achievement. That is because, 
in the Judeo-Christian tradition from which Büchner’s text ultimately springs, the idea of 
incarnation is associated with silence at least as much as it is with articulate form. Büchner’s 
Lenz is heir to that tradition as well as exemplifying the European tradition of narrative 
realism which, as Erich Auerbach showed, ultimately derives from it.
26
 However, Büchner’s 
text also exemplifies the creative tension between the two traditions which the German mode 
of realist narrative especially brings to expression.    
That tension closely parallels a disjunction between the aesthetic mode of representation in 
Büchner’s work and the ontological vision which informs it. As John Reddick especially has 
shown
27, Büchner’s work as a whole – his natural scientific researches, his dramatic and 
narrative works as much as his political vision of a free and humane society – is underscored 
by a persistent opposition between a vision of the human and natural world as a meaningful 
whole, and an immediate existential awareness of the incoherence, indeed the inarticulate 
pain, of actual experience. Sometimes the holistic vision is articulated in both philosophical 
and aesthetic terms as in Büchner’s ‘Trial Lecture’ (‘Probevorlesung’) ‘On the Nerves of the 
Skull’ (‘Über Schädelnerven’) delivered in Zürich in 1836 (MA. p. 257-269). There Büchner 
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opposes to the ‘teleological’ (‘teleologisch’) or mechanical view of nature associated with 
France the ‘philosophical’ (‘philosophisch’) view of his own associated with the 
‘Naturphilosophie’ (‘philosophy of nature’) inherited from German idealism. Where the 
teleological view explains the whole of organic life in terms of its fitness for purpose, the 
philosophical perspective considers each and every living being and its parts as meaningful in 
themselves: ‘Alles, was ist, ist um seiner selbst willen da’ (‘everything which is exists for its 
own sake’) (MA, p. 260). The purpose of the philosophical investigation of nature is to 
discern the very law of Being conceived in this sense, which for Büchner is also ‘a law of 
beauty’ (‘[ein] Gesetz der Schönheit’, MA, p. 260). Büchner significantly adds that the 
scientific bridge between this vision and actual phenomena has yet to be built: ‘Daβ es bis 
jetzt gelungen sei, zwischen letzterem und dem Naturleben, das wir unmittelbar wahrnehmen, 
eine Brücke zu schlagen, muβ die Kritik verneinen’ (MA, p. 260). Büchner’s ‘philosophische 
Ansicht’ (‘philosophical view’) of nature is less a theory than a perspective: a way of seeing 
motivated as much by ontological as by ‘scientific’ criteria and soon destined empirically to 
be refuted by the Darwinian theory of evolution. 
 However, in Büchner’s work as a whole the real ‘refutation of idealism’ is by human 
experience, not by scientific facts. That experience is always Büchner’s central concern. 
From this perspective, the philosophical affirmation is as necessary, and as meaningful, as the 
existential truth which negates it. For Büchner’s creative insight can never be reduced to a 
single, let alone a seamless, vision of human experience. On the speculative level of his Trial 
Lecture Büchner’s philosophical vision is indeed also an aesthetic one. Yet his dramatic and 
narrative work uses all the resources of language and representation to highlight the distance 
between the aesthetic vision and the reality of human experience. In Woyzeck Büchner’s 
inarticulate leading character is tormented by a doctor who expounds a pastiche of quasi-
Hegelian moralism ‘in dem Menschen verklärt sich die Individualität zur Freiheit’: (‘in 
14 
 
humanity individuality transfigures itself into freedom’) (MA, p. 242) that affirms human 
freedom from natural causes whilst reducing his patient to the level of an animal or a thing: 
‘Woyzeck er hat die schӧnste aberratio mentalis partialis[…] sehr schön ausgeprägt’ 
(‘Woyzeck you have a perfect form of partial mental aberration, beautifully expressed’) (MA, 
p. 243). The point is not the content of the doctor’s philosophy (he seems closer to a German 
philosopher than a French materialist) but the degrading human effect it has on his patient.  
For Büchner, the real presence of truth in our experience and therefore in our language is 
neither aesthetic nor philosophical, but existential in kind. Indeed, his greatest aesthetic 
achievement – which in Lenz is one of narrative realism par excellence – is to make manifest 
the distance between the two kinds of truth. In Büchner’s work, the break in the covenant 
between words and the Word predates the moment of modernity which Steiner defines; but it 
remains profoundly relevant to Steiner’s theme.  Büchner’s text is unthinkable without the 
intellectual and spiritual vocabulary of Christian doctrine, especially the emphasis on the 
centrality of suffering and the religious meaning of ordinary experience which the German 
Protestant and pietist tradition particularly defines.
28
 However, the concern of Büchner’s Lenz 
with the real presence of truth is also inseparable from its specifically literary realism. 
Büchner’s Lenz is supremely about the tension between human self-consciousness and the 
quest for wholeness of experience. It is about the irreversible difference between its central 
character’s consciousness of himself and his consciousness of others and the material world. 
For all the power of its evocation of the experience of a particular self, Lenz also contains a 
plurality of narrative perspectives which show his character Lenz’s experience in relation to, 
                                                          
28
 On this point see Wolfgang Wittkowski, Georg Büchner (as in fn. 22, pp. 357-366 and 
Georg Büchner. Rückblick und Einblick (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2009), pp. 147-158 
(‘Die Philosophen und der Pietismus. Ethik und ethische Interpretation’). See also Erwin 
Kobel, Georg Büchner. Das dichterische Werk (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1974), pp. 151-
158.   
15 
 
and yet alienated from, the experience of other selves and therefore the truth of the human 
world. 
These are precisely the qualities which led German idealist aesthetics to judge modern 
narrative realism as inadequate to the task of art as a medium of truth in the modern world. 
But they are also the qualities which make it appropriate to describe Büchner’s Lenz as a 
locus of real presence. For this text is not about the idea of incarnation, but its reality: the 
truth that ultimate meaning can be apprehended only in the particular and private – because 
incarnate – reality of human selfhood. That truth is indeed really present in Büchner’s text, 
because what we call his realism makes it real.  
  
 
 
 
   
